Questions about individual parts of claim 1: what if that part was like this, and not that.
1.1monitoring from outside the store
What if it was like thisWhat if the data store were monitored from outside the data store?
…and not this“monitoring a SaaS data store or a cloud-native data store from inside the data store;”
A network tap or a switch port mirror copies traffic flowing between clients and the data store. A packet capture appliance inspects the copied traffic for query patterns, authentication attempts, and data transfer volumes.
1.2manual review of attack lifecycle
What if it was like thisWhat if the attack lifecycle progression were identified by manual review?
…and not this“examining an attack and automatically identifying how far the attack has progressed in an attack lifecycle;”
An analyst reviews logs and alerts from the data store to determine the stage of the attack. The analyst correlates timestamps of user actions, query executions, and data access events to map the progression.
1.3identifying target via metadata tags
What if it was like thisWhat if the target and scope were identified using metadata tags?
…and not this“identifying a target and scope of the attack to evaluate how far attackers have penetrated a monitored system and an identification of the target; and”
Data objects in the data store are tagged with metadata indicating their classification, owner, and purpose. The system queries these tags to determine which assets are being accessed and the extent of the access.
1.4asset value via historical access
What if it was like thisWhat if the asset value were established using historical access patterns?
…and not this“establishing a value of an asset subject to an attacker's attack and mapping an impact of the attack on a confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) triad.”
The system analyzes historical logs to count the number of reads, writes, and queries on each data object. Assets with high access frequencies or frequent modifications are assigned higher values based on their usage metrics.
1.1monitoring via agentless API polling
What if it was like thisWhat if the data store were monitored via agentless API polling?
…and not this“monitoring a SaaS data store or a cloud-native data store from inside the data store;”
A monitoring service periodically calls the data store's application programming interface to retrieve audit logs and access records. The service parses the returned data to detect anomalies without installing software inside the data store.
Section 2 · machine-generated
Variations
Further arrangements of the same subject matter, described here as of the publication date at the foot of this page.
Other field of use
monitoring industrial control data stores
The method monitors operational technology data stores from inside the data store. It examines access patterns to identify reconnaissance and infiltration in industrial control systems. It maps the impact of the attack on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of industrial processes.
monitoring healthcare data repositories
The method monitors healthcare data repositories from inside the data store. It examines access patterns to identify reconnaissance and infiltration in healthcare systems. It maps the impact of the attack on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of patient data.
Component substitution
using graph databases for attack mapping
The method uses a graph database to store and analyze the attack lifecycle. It maps the attack progression by traversing nodes and edges representing assets and access paths. It evaluates the impact on the CIA triad by analyzing the graph structure.
Parameter or scale variation
monitoring petabyte-scale data lakes
The method monitors data lakes containing petabytes of data. It examines access patterns at a scale of millions of queries per day. It maps the impact of the attack on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data lake.
Combination with existing systems
integrating with security information and event management
The method integrates with a security information and event management system. It sends attack lifecycle data to the SIEM system for correlation and analysis. It maps the impact of the attack on the CIA triad using SIEM data.
Automated or data-driven variant
using machine learning for attack detection
The method uses machine learning models to detect reconnaissance and infiltration. It trains models on historical access patterns to identify anomalies. It maps the impact of the attack on the CIA triad using model outputs.
Section 3 · quoted from USPTO records
Other work
Passages reproduced word for word from two earlier-published U.S. patent documents, placed beside the language of claim 1. No characterization is offered. Each passage is marked A or B for the document it comes from; ¶ numbers are the paragraph numbers in the USPTO’s published full text of that document.
1.1monitoring a SaaS data store or a cloud-native data store from inside the data store;
In general, security sensors included in the system 100 may include network based (NIDS) and host based (HIDS) intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems (IPS), anti-virus systems, firewalls, and other detection/logging services (e.g., web server logs, database logs, etc.) which can monitor communications activity to and from computing devices included in the industrial technology (IT) network domain 102, the IT DMZ 106a, the operational technology (OT) network
B · US 10,812,499 B2 · ¶ 24
1.2examining an attack and automatically identifying how far the attack has progressed in an attack lifecycle;
For each alert of the multiple alerts, a classification of the alert is determined with respect to a cyber kill chain (e.g., information technology cyber kill chain or industrial control system cyber kill chain).
B · US 10,812,499 B2 · ¶ 2
1.3identifying a target and scope of the attack to evaluate how far attackers have penetrated a monitored system and an identification of the target; and
In general, rule-based filtering performed by each of the rule-based filters 310 and 312 can remove irrelevant events/alerts (e.g., events/alerts that are not determined to be associated with a potential attack) based on a target's profile and/or characteristics of the events/alerts.
B · US 10,812,499 B2 · ¶ 36
1.4establishing a value of an asset subject to an attacker's attack and mapping an impact of the attack on a confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) triad.
At block 205, the prioritization module determines the classification of the sensitivity level for the destination endpoint based on asset valuation.
A · US 10,171,483 B1 · ¶ 34
An empty cell means only that no passage was reproduced there.
Statements in these documents
Traditional intrusion systems apply every signature in the collection to every network payload, which can cause resource bottlenecks and can negatively affect network throughput.
A · US 10,171,483 B1 · ¶ 2
In one implementation, an apparatus for integrating endpoint asset awareness to improve data center network-based intrusion systems is described.
A · US 10,171,483 B1 · ¶ 3
The present disclosure relates to security and network operations.
B · US 10,812,499 B2 · ¶ 1
Cite aspatent.fyi, US 12,794,913 B2, claim 1, first published 2026-11-18T12:58:15-05:00, https://patent.fyi/US12794913/, SHA-256 b9a3c66a676d38858416627c13656188ea32ad4a38af36401fd9076b7abc9a57